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ABSTRACT
Our current view of the severe dissociative disorders as trau-
ma-based implies that the dissociated material consists of the trau-
matic abuse memories, related traumatic affects, etc., and does not
adequately address what else is dissociated. It is argued here that
chronic, severe trauma also results in the splitting offof the child's
healthy, developmental, relational needs and longings. By segre-
gating those needs and longings which are offensive to the child's
pathologically-vulnerable caretakers, dissociative defenses serve to
maintain and regulate relatedness to others. This expanded view of
dissociation suggests that the treatment ofsevere dissociative disor-
ders must include the remobilization of those early relational need
states within the transference relationship and their integration into
the patient's central selfexperience.
Our growing understanding that the severe dissociative
disorders are the offspring oftrauma (Spiegel, 1984; Putnam,
1989; Ross, 1989; Schultz, Braun, & Kluft,1989) has brought
abouta revolution in their treatment over the past two decades.
At the same time, the prevailing focus in the multiple per-
sonality disorder (MPD) field on trauma-that is, the over-
whelming trauma ofactive, intrusive abuse-has also brought
with it a narrowing of vision that I wish to address in this
brief article.
At issue is our theoretical grasp of what, exactly, is dis-
sociated. The current etiological emphasis on trauma car-
ries with it the implication that the dissociated material con-
sists primarily ofabuse memories and related traumatic affects,
sensations etc., an implication which continues to have pro-
found consequences for our understanding of the psycho-
dynamics of the disorder and for our philosophy of treat-
ment as well. The notion that MPD involves the dissociation
of "trauma" leads inevitably to the persistent preoccupation
in the field with "memory work," the belief that the recov-
ery, abreaction and integration of abuse memories is the
overarching goal of therapy, and-despite some significant
recentattempts to the contrary (Barach, 1991; Davies & Frawley,
1991; Sands, 1991b; Liotti, 1992; Kinsler, 1992; Schwartz,
1994)-to the continuing failure of the field as a whole to
understand dissociative disorders as disorders of relation-
ship.
More specifically, what the prevailing theories fail to exam-
ine sufficiently are the ways in which chronic, severe abuse
results notonlyin the traumatic memories and affects' being
dissociated, but also in the child's healthy, relational needs
(for empathy, affect attunement, soothing, admiration, secu-
rity, self-differentiation, etc.) and the longings and relational
fantasies linked up with these needs' being split off as well.
In other words, when a relationship is traumatizing, a child
cannot use that relationship to meet his or her deepestyearn-
ings, and these yearnings must go underground. Indeed, if
only the "trauma" were split off, the consequences for per-
sonality development would not be so severe.
This expanded, relational psychoanalytic view of disso-
ciation further suggests that the treatment of severe disso-
ciative disorders must include the remobilization of those
hidden needs and longingswithin the transference relationship
and their integration into the patient's central self experi-
ence. Indeed, itis the recrudescence ofthe dissociated, rela-
tional needs and fantasies which accounts for much of the
harrowing and tumultuous nature ofMPD treatment. In the
language ofaffects (Stolorow, Brankchaft, & Atwood, 1987),
"need" is best translated as "longing" or "yearning." "Longing"
is also a more appropriate term in the language of subjec-
tive experience (Kohut, 1977; Stolorow et aI., 1987) than
the more reified, experience-distant "need." However,
because "need" is still a more recognizable and commonly
understood psychological construct, "need,"will be used in ter-
changeably with "longing" and "yearning."
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Psychoanalytic views
Only recently has relationship been included in our for-
mulations of dissociation or, for that matter, in our under-
standing of any of the defenses. ntil the last few years, psy-
choanalytic contributions on multiple personality and
dissociation (e.g., Breuer& Freud, 1953a; Freud, 1953b; Glover,
1943; Lasky, 1978; Marmer, 1980; Berman, 1981) have
focused on the defense mechanism of splitting. (For a dis-
cussion ofpsychoanalytic formulations ofMPD and splitting,
see Berman, 1981.) Splitting, like all defense mechanisms
in classical psychoanalytic thinking, has been conceptual-
ized as an intrapsychic defense againstunconscious, forbidden
aggressive or libidinal impulses. Similarly, in much of the
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object relations literature, dissociation and spliuing ha\"c
been seen similarly in purely intrapsychic terms as defens-
es againsl unconscious ambh'alence (e.g., Fairbairn, 1952;
Kcrnbcrg. 1975) rather than as arising In an llltcrsubjectivc
conlcxL
With the concepts of ~false seU- and '''vertical splil,"
Winuicolt (1965) and Kohut (1971) respectively look sig-
nificant steps towards including the actll<.ll relationship with
the caretakers in their formulations of splitling and disso-
ciation. Winnicott (1960) viewed the splitling offof tile true
self as a means of protecting it frOIll ~impillgcmclll" by the
environment-that is. from the failure of the ~mother" to
sen'c as ...he medium for formlcssnc5s or lhe inSl.rumenl of
omnipotence. Kohut (1971) argued Lhalavcrticalsplitdcvel-
aI's due to tlle failed empathic responsiveness of the em;-
ronment and the subsequent need to distort the self to com-
ply with the narcissistic demands of the caretaker. In the
\;ewsofKohut and \VinnicOlt and their followers, the child's
genuine needs are split orror dissociated until such time as
conditions are safe enough (e.g., a trusting therapeutic rela-
tionship) for dc\'elopment to begin again where it was ear-
lier derailed.
Neither Kohutnor Winnicou applied their ideas on split.-
ting to MPD, but Gruellcwald (1977) has donc so for Kohut,
as has Smith (1989) forWinnicott. Gruenewald (1977) likens
the kind of sptining ill multiple personality disorder to that
in narcissistic personalitydisorders--that is, '\'ertical~in nature.
Smith (1989) views MPD as a layered false self organization
stemming from an initial psyche-soma split designed to pro-
tect the true self from an impinging ellvironment. In addi-
tion, Ulman and Brothers (1988), following Kohut, explore
how t.rauma results in the shattering of narcissistic fantasies.
Marmcr (l980), following Winnicou (1953), suggests that
ahcr personalities be viewed as transitional objects ofchild-
hood, located somewhere between inner and outer reality.
Two recent contributions bring contemporary rela-
tional psychoanalytic models to bear On dissociation and
MPD. Using an object-relations pcrspcClive, Davies and
Frawlcy (1991) discuss the splitting ofTo[the self- and object-
representations attached to memories and fantasied elabo-
rations of incest traUln:.l and explorc the transfcrence-eoull-
tcrtransference picture comprising fantasized victim, abuser
and idealized omnipotent $a\;or. Schwartz (1994) propos-
es a comprehensive relational psychoanalytic model, con-
ceptualizing MPD as a variation of narcissistic personality
organization involving an over-reliance on omnipotent
defenses, the collapse of illlersubjective experiencing and
disruptions of aggression. fanta5}' and the usc of transition-
al phenomena. Neil.herofthese excellent relationalaccounts,
howC\'er,gi\'CSadequateallention to the dissociation ofhealthy.
dcvelopmental need SUites and the later imporlanceofremo-
bilizing these need stales in treatment.
DissQ{.;anan/Trauma Literature
The dissociativc disorders and trauma literatures have
for the most part conceptualized dissociation as a defense
against Q\'envhelming traumatic memory and affect (e.g..
Braun, 1986,1988: KJufl. 1984; Ross, 1989; Putnam, 1985;
146
Spiegel, 1984; van der Kolk, 1987). Multiple personality dis-
order is now univcrsally viewed as a post-traumatic stress dis-
order (e.g., Spiegel. 1984; Ross, 1989). According to Putnam
(l989), the process of dissociation ~binds pain and horror
hydi\'iding it into little part.s and storing it in such a way that
it is difficult to reassemble and to remember" ( p.125), a
descriptioll which is certainly eloquent and true but which
fails to acknowledge the dissociation of healthy relational
needs. While many contributions, followi ng Braull 's ( 1986)
BASK model, enlarge the concept ofdissociation to include
behavior, alIen, sensation and knowledgc, their focus isstill
the contents of tr;luma.
It is not thatthcse accounts fail to acknowledge tlle MPD
patient's intense dependency upon the therapist. Much has
lx.-cn written on hO\\'to understand and manage these paticnts'
ovenvhcIming needs through interpretation, h}pnosis.limit-
selling, confrontation. maintaining firm boundaries, con-
tracting, etc. (e.g., Kluft, 1992; Chu, 1992). Too often. how-
e\'er, the need states remobilized in the therapy are \'iewed
as something to be resolved and managed along the way to
the real work oflherapy (i.e., the abreactive/integrativc work)
rather than recognized as being at the very heart of the ther-
apy.
Those contributions to the dissociative disorders field
which explore the transference relationship should also be
notcd, beginning with Wilbur (1988). Klllft (e.g., 1992) has
consistently revealed a deep psychoanal),tic understanding
of working with the transference needs of patients and has
characterized the process of integration in MPD treatment
aswithin the tradition ofpsychoanal}·tic perspectlveson struc-
turalchange (KJuft. 1993). Loewenstein (1993) hasdiscussed
the post-traumatic and dissociative aspects of transference
and countertransference in the treatment of MPD. Kinsler
(I992) has argued forcefully for the central importance of
profound therapeutic engagemelll Witll MPO patients. But
these accounts still fail to link thc dissociative !Jrocess per 51!
with the segregation throughout development of healthy
need states which arc then re-awakened in the therapy.
What I am suggesting here may appear to bring us back
full circle to the much earlierandcul'l'ently repudiated ~repar­
enting~ trddition of ~lPD treatment, in that these therapists
did encourage the emergence and gratification of the early
de\'elopmental needs within the thcrapeutic relationship.
Bowe\·er. repareming efforts were almost invariabl}' associ-
ated with severe boundar)'violations and arc not considered
appropriate approaches (KIlIft, personal communication.
April. 1994). \Vhile both the early rcparenting tI<l.dition and
the relational pS}'choanalyticapproach advocated here allow
for lhe remobilization ofearly need states, I believe that the
needs will be integrated not bygratification butonlythrough
psychoanalytic underst;lllding 'lI1d interpretation.
Two recent c011lributions bring Bowlby's attachment the-
ory to the dissociative disorders field and come closest to
addressing the kindsofrelational, developmental issues under
discussion here. Harach (1991) and Lioui (1992) argue that
MPDshould best be viewed asa disordcrofatL,chment. Bar.ach
relates MPD to the process of~detachmcnt"(Bowlby, 1982),
de~ribinghow the parent.s' emotional neglect leads tllC child
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to detach from internal and external signals that would nor-
mally lead him to search for a parent. Upon the detached
state are superimposed the sequelae ofactive abuse. Barach
also explores the ways in which attachment needs and behav-
iors become mobilized in both patient and therapist during
the treatment process. Liotti (1992) argues that the disso-
ciative disorders are better conceptualized as relating to the
"disorganized/disoriented" form of attachment (Main &
Solomon, 1986), which manifests in the infant's display of
odd, disorganized, seemingly inexplicable and conflicting
behavior patterns in the parent's presence. This "disorga-
nized/disoriented" form of attachment is related to fright-
ened and/or frightening parental behavior which may stem
from the parents' own unresolved trauma. The infant's dis-
organized/disoriented attachment behavior corresponds to
an internal working model ofselfand attachment figure that
is multiple and incoherent. Multiple internal working mod-
els, Liotti hypothesizes, may be responsible for the child's
later predisposition to dissociation in the face offurther trau-
matic experiences.
Like Barach and Liotti, I view relationship disorder as
being at the heart ofmultiple personality disorder and attach-
ment behavior as crucial to development. However, I think
there are other crucial developmental needs in addition to
attachment, needs which may be less related to protection
and security and which will be discussed further below.
THE DISCUSSION OF EARLY RELATIONAL
NEED STATES
Relatianal Need States
In using the term, "relational needs," I am referring to
early developmen tal needs wh ich are necessaryfor the devel-
opment of the self. These relational needs are experienced
by the individual as longings, that is, as affects, which signal
the organism that certain environmental responses are miss-
ing which are necessary for self development. I have chosen
the term "relational need" to emphasize that these nuclear
needs can only be met through relationship and, in fact, can
be experienced only in the context of relationship, whether
conscious or unconscious. Indeed, I believe that a relation-
al need state must necessarily always imply at least a fantasy
of an "other," be it conscious or unconscious. Indeed, the
needs become dissociated precisely because they are rela-
tional; that is, the child tries to protect him or herself as well
as the caretaker from the impact ofher needs, knowing only
too well that the relationship cannot tolerate them.
As discussed above, Barach (1992) and Liotti (1992)
focus solely on the needs for attachment, while I believe that
there are many other developmental, relational needs which
are also dissociated when caretaking is severely abusive.
Attachment needs, in Bowlby's technical sense, refer par-
ticularly to the security ofthe biological organism. According
to Bowlby (1982), the attachment system is an innate behav-
ioral control system that motivates primates to search for
the protective proximity of conspecifics whenever the indi-
vidual is distressed, threatened or frightened by environ-
mental danger. What of all the other emotional needs that
children hope to have met by their caretakers even when
they are not distressed, threatened or frightened? Kohut
(1971,1984) named three such "self-object needs" necessary
for the development of the self: the need to have the devel-
oping self mirrored (i.e., admired and confirmed), to ide-
alize a calm and powerful other, and to experience an essen-
tial alikeness with or twinship with an other. Wolf (1988)
proposed the need for a benign "adversary." Stern (1985)
and Stolorow et al. (1987) have discussed the overarching
need for "affect attunement"; Be~amin (1990) the all-impor-
tant need for "recognition." The list could go on and on. I
have deliberately chosen to use the term "relational need"
here, because it is inclusive, even vague, and therefore can
encompass the myriad ofdevelopmental needs experienced
by the (healthy) child, many of which have not yet found
labels.
The Dissociation ofthe Relatianal Need States
How, then, are these relational need states dissociated?
Put in the simplest theoretical terms, those parts of the self
which are responded to empathically during early develop-
ment become integrated into the self. Those which are trau-
matically rejected, neglected or distorted because they
threaten the caretakers narcissistic equilibrium become dis-
avowed or dissociated from the total self structure (Kohut,
1971, 1977). In other words, when the central caretaking
relationship is traumatizing, a child cannot use that rela-
tionship to meet his or her deepest yearnings, and these
yearnings must go into hiding.
I view MPD as a severe self disorder-that is, a disorder
which develops due to pervasive disturbance in theempath-
ic interplay between the growing child and the care-giving
environment andwhich eventuates in serious structural deficits
in the self, particularly in self-regulation and self-cohesion.
Thisview is confirmed by studies ofthe developmental pathol-
ogy caused by severe abuse (Cole & Putnam, 1992; Fink,
1988; Peoples, 1991) which conclude that the effects are
most pronounced in the domain of self-development. The
extreme forms of active and sadistic abuse which we see in
parents of MPD patients are always but one part of a much
more pervasive and insidious failure to respond empathi-
cally to the developmental needs of the child, including the
more "passive" forms like neglect and abandonment. Parents
ofMPD, who often themselves have MPD or other severe psy-
chopathology and who are struggling with their own over-
whelming unmet needs, invariably invert the normal par-
ent/child relationship and come to expect the child to meet
their own narcissistic needs. The child is seen as a self-object
rather than a self.
Incestuous abuse is particularly damaging to the child's
needs system, for the child's own needs for love, comfort,
soothing and touching are themselves exploited and used
for the parent's own gratification. The child then experi-
ences the needs themselves as contaminated and bad or,
even more devastating, as evidence thathe or she is an accom-
plice in the incest.
When the parent perpetrator is also sadistic, which is
usually reported to be the case with MPD patients, there results
147
DISSOCLUlO:\. rol. \11. :\0. 3. September 1994
a terrible distortion, even re\'ersal. of the normal
need/response C}'de, Thc child's need for help, the nud
itMlf, triggers the caretaker's need lO hurt: the child's pain,
the pain itself,gl"3tifies the caretaker and intensifies thedesire
to hurt more, Thechild learns that need states lead ine\;tably
to pain and that showing pain leads to more pain. Thus, the
needs themselves must not be acknowledged lest they be
expressed and awaken a sadistic response in the caretaker.
The child's "ariOlls n<'''eds and affects are split up and hid-
den awav among various parts of the self.
In addition to the need states' beingsplit off, the child's
ability to express need S\1nbolically as wish is also se\'erely
hampered by ongoing, traumatic breaches of empathy.
Auerhahn and Laub (19 7) describe this process in their
study of Holocaust sun;\'Ors. whom they describe as ha\ing
lost their capacin' for \\ish-organized symbolic functioning.
The child's intemal playground. which \\innicon (1953)
calls potential or transitional space, cannot deyelop or. if
embr}"onicallv developed. cannot be maintained in an abu-
sh'elyimpingingemironmenL It is within that potential space
between inside and outside, between priman'and secondary
process, between fantasy and reality that the child can play
with desire. When that intemal space is traumatically col-
lapsed. the capacity to play, to \\;sh and to dream is lost also.
Multiple personalit) disorder results when the caretak-
ers' ongoing active, sadistic abuse coupled with their ongo-
ing rejection. distortion and exploitation of the child's cen-
tral need states necessitates the sequestering ofthe different
need states along with the traumatic material into separate
parts of the self. Then. in the presence of high dissociative
abilit)" these pan-selves can become amalgamated with
childhood fantasiesofrestimtion (Young, 1988), concretized
(Stolorow et aI., 1987) and personified into alter personal-
ities. With structuraliLatiOll into multiplicity. there also
comes a collapsc into polarities, as no one alter can hold
hold the parAdox of contradictory need and affect states.
Thus. an outcome of MPD suggests the most pervasive and
profound failure ofenvironmental response, a failure so pro-
found that the child is compelled 10 escape his own subjec-
tivity and dissociate his very selJ{Spiegcl, 1986).
SU1.lCnllalization in to multiplicity is also the child'sattempt
to create a restitutive system by which internal selves, rather
than other people. are relied upon to meet cnlcial nuclear
needs, because tul'l1ing to people had led to intolerable dis-
appointment. abuse and shame. The intemal alter person-
alities protect the system from bccoming oven\'helmed, con-
tain intolerdble affcct, soothe, create hope, ete., functions
which the environment has not been able to provide
(Manner, 1980). Aradical fonn ofprecociousself-sufficiency
develops, wherein needs are not e\'en felt, much less
expressed. B)' imesting in internal rather than external object
relations. the child circum\'ents the need for the caretakers'
responsivenessancl prot<.'Cts him or herselffrom funherabuse
and shame. The multiplicit\' also relieves the caretaking rela-
tionship of the impossible burden of ha\;ng to meet his or
her needs, Howe\'er. once multiplicity is employed as a solu-
tion. the indhidual's development is also derailed. The carl)'
needs remain split off and cannot be integrated into the
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central personality. The Mhost- goes about the task of living
bereft of the full range of his or her human responsiveness.
The DissociatiQlI ofRnge
Also dissociated is the narcissistic rage that goes hand
in hand \\ith thc terriblc narcissistic irtiuI1'ofongoingabuse-
particularh·thc rage born ofthe relentless failureofthe care-
givers to meet the nudearneeds ofthechild's fragile. de\-el-
oping self.
In the chronicall~ threatening early environment ofthe
indi\idual \\ith ~IPD. there is no place for the rage to go.
The perpetrators arc Munauackable- in the sense that an
ang~' outburst which threatens their ollU1ipotence can Iit-
erallv result in injun or death. The rage instead becomes
Strllcturalized \<o'ithin the :\IPD S\'stem in the fonn of Mhostile
alters.-who tend to remain in hiding until O"eatrnent is well
undcrn'3y. In \et another pal"3doxical t\\ist ofMI'D, all the
so-called hostile alters also operate in some \\aY to prot«t the
needs of the child's fragile. de..-e1oping self. some by pre-
venting the dangerous ,'cvclation of the abuse memories,
some bv gagging the needv child alters. ete. Some are iden-
tified \\ith the perpetrator. Identif)ing \\ith the aggressor
not onl)' shores up a fragile sense of self; it also. in inter-
subjecrr.·e tenns, maintains a life-sustaining, uncoll.sciouscon-
neclion with thc other through identification. Idemining
\\iUl the aggressor can also be moth-ated by Ule wish to make
the bad parent good (e.g.. Shengold, 1989) by internalizing
U1C bad parent, making the self Mbad- and thus purif)ing the
actual parent.
It is as Winnicou (1971) said-an object who cannot
slln'i\,c destruction in fant<c>)'remainsan intcmal object under
one·sfanL.'\Sied omnipOlentconrrol. Elabol"3tingon WinnicotL
Benjamin (1990) SL1tes: Mwhen the other does not sunive
and aggression is not dissipatcd, it becomcs almost cxclu-
sh'el)' illlrapsychic ....What cannOl be worked through and
dissolved with thc olll.'lide other is transposed into a drama
of internal objects" (1'.41). In MPD, ulis intcrnal drama of
aggression takes place among the alter personalities, ccr-
tain I)' a lcss dangerous state of affairs than actually fighting
with one's perpetrators. The intrapsychic drama finall),
becomes played om 011 the external stage \\ithin the trans-
ference, where the therapist and patient take turns playing
the roles ofahuscr and abused, Painful, compulsi\'e re-enact-
ments often dominate the therapy. repeating the sado-
ma1>ochistic dynamics of the original traumatic intemctions.
Addictive Processes as a Mea,u ofAccessing Needs
Once the needs and longings have been segregated, the
indhidual ma)' attempt to use addicti\'e/dissociati\'e processes
as a means of maintaining the dissociation and also. para-
doxicall)', as a \\'3~ of accessing and tcmporarily gratif)ing
ule needs,
I ha\'e suggested earlier that dissociation is a neglected
link in the chaincd sequence leading to and through addic-
tive aCth;t\' (Sands, 199101). Emironmental failure uiggers
traumatic memol)'\\'hich evokes traumatic affect which leads
to the need for some k.ind of addictive acti\it)' (e.g.. drugs
or alcohol. an eating disorder. compulsive exercise. com-
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pulsive work, self-harm, etc.) the aim of which is an altered
or dissociative state which keeps dissociated that which one
dares not experience. At the same time, addictive/dissocia-
tive processes serve another, seemingly contradictory, func-
tion by allowing the individual to access the needs embed-
ded in the split-off parts of the self. As I wrote earlier in
regards to bulimia:
... when the individual ... begins to exper-
iment with bulimia, the biochemical effects
ofthe binge-purge cycle create an altered state
that serves to reinforce the already existing
split in the psyche and further organize the
dissociated needs in to a "bulimic self." The
split-off state becomes associated with the
bulimia, and the bulimic behavior becomes
a way ofvoluntarily accessing this hidden self.
(Sands, 1991a, p. 40).
The addictive behavior also offers some actual gratifi-
cation of the needs by providing soothing, comfort, etc. The
disadvantages of such addictive-dissociative processes, of
course, is that they do not "work," because the self-regula-
tory functions they provide, while often seductively power-
ful in the moment, are only temporary. As Kohut (1978)
said of the addictions, "it is as if a person with a wide-open
gastric fistula were trying to still his hunger through eat-
ing... " (p. 847) . The individual is not satiated; tolerance sets
in, and more and more of the addictive activity is required.
Most regrettably, the needs which can be truly engaged only
through relationship remain split off, unmet, and uninte-
grated.
THE RELATIONAL FUNCTION OF
DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS
Bysequestering early narcissistic needs and affectswhich
are offensive to the MPD child's pathologically-vulnerable
caretakers, dissociative defenses serve to regulate relatedness
to others (Sue Saperstein, personal communication, August,
1991). Paradoxically, multiples take parts of themselves "out
ofrelationship for the sake ofrelationship" (Gilligan, 1990).
Since a relationship by definition has two parts to it, the
dissociation of relational needs works in two ways to regu-
late and maintain relationship. One way is by changing one's
perception of oneself, the second by altering perception of
the other. It has been repeatedly noted that dissociation
involves a profound alteration ofselfexperience ( e.g., Spiegel,
1986; Fink, 1988; Sands, 1991b). The "I " which remains
intact when other defenses are employed is not maintained
in dissociation, and dissociated content becomes not me
(Fink,1988). Thus, the traumatic events become not me, (as
well as not you) and, as I have argued above, the early devel-
opmental needs for soothing, comfort, protection, admira-
tion etc. become not me as well. By removing the offending
needs and longings from the experience of self, the disso-
ciative defenses protect the selffrom the untoward reactions
of the other (Stolorow et aI., 1987), reactions which, in the
case of many of our MPD patients, have the potential to be
lethal.
Moreover, when the offending need states are split off
from ones central self experience, the other is made to look
better. The caretaker is "excused" from being asked to meet
the child's needs and failing miserably, and the child is pro-
tected from his or her disappointment and rage at the care-
taker's failure to respond. The child is saying in essence,
"Since I don't have needs, you are not failing to meet them."
By protecting the other from the needs and affects which
are intolerable to the other, the child shores up the func-
tioning of the emotionally fragile caretaker.
All these dissociative maneuvers serve to support, main-
tain and regulate relationship. The dissociative cleansing of
oneselfand the other ofoffending affects and attributes reg-
ulates the tenuous connection to the other and allows the
child and later the adult to maintain that modicum of reiat-
edness necessary for survival. These positive, relational func-
tions of dissociative defenses have been underemphasized
in both the dissociative disorders/trauma and the psycho-
analytic literature (Sands, 1991a). Indeed, the metaphors
of dissociative process themselves suggest a "getting away
from"- dissociating, splitting off, walling off, sequestering-
when the ultimate purpose ofdissociative defenses is rather
a "staying with." The dissociative patientis attempting to stay
enough in relationship with the human environment to sur-
vive the present while, at the same time, keeping the needs
for more intimate relatedness sequestered but alive in the
hope that they can be awakened at a safer, future time.
TREATMENT
From this perspective of dissociated relational needs, it
becomes clear that the healing process can take place only
when the patient is able to remobilize his or her sequestered
need states and longings. The relational needs, which have
existed only in rudimentary, "potential" form, can now become
articulated, developed and experienced fully in relationship
to the therapist who has become the wished-for object. As
the need states and longings are carefully understood and
interpreted within the transference, they will be felt more
generally and can slowly and painfully become an integral
part of the patient's self experience. This process cannot
begin, of course, until some semblance of safety and trust
has been established, and the patient can dare to hope that
his or her most vulnerable and early need states can finally
be broughtinto relationship. The longings will both be expe-
rienced and alternately violently resisted vis avis the thera-
pist, and it is this wrenching conflict around approaching
the early relational needs which accounts for much of the
harrowing and tumultuous nature of the treatment ofMPD.
This certainly does not mean that the remobilization
and integration of the early relational needs comprises the
entirety ofthe treatmentprocess. In addition, traumatic mem-
ories and affects must be recovered, experienced in the trans-
ference, and integrated, the various aspects of the patient's
character pathology (notably, omnipotence and sado-
masochism) analyzed and worked through, new life narra-
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ti,'es and meanings negotiated, erc. But it is well to remem-
ber, when one seems to be doing plimarily Mmemorywork, ~
that lhe memories are often in the senice of the transfer-
ence rather than ,ice ,'ersa; thai is. the recoH~ryof memo-
ries may allow the patielll lO gel doser to or more distalll
from the therapist. may ~testMthe therapisl'sability to under-
stand and respond to various need states (Sands. 1991 b) or
may pose any number of other Mquestions~ regarding the
relationship.
In m}' experience, the need states become mobilized
aher by alter and only after the indi,idual alters have had a
chance [Q abreaci some of their abuse memories. Onl)' then
do the} become -freed up- to experience their own partic-
ular unmetlongings for the empathy, soothing, admiration,
etc. that they were not allowed to experience as children
and which, despile their outstanding imaginatiw potentials,
they haw been unable 10 successfully create ,\;thin them-
selves. In other words, each aher must develop a separate
and different ~transference of need- to the therapist.
Revealing these learnings is frightening and disorganizing
in the extreme, for the needs have been so consistently dis-
toned, exploited and rejected ~'thecaretakers that the patient
nowautomaticallyexperiences them as threatening and alien-
ating to otJlers. Herein lies the greatest anguish for these
indi\iduals. Thatwhich is most fen'entln-earned for-whether
it be empathy, admiration, soothing, or whate\'er-is also
thai which is most desperatel}' feared. Understandably, the
patient's revelation of the hidden needs and fantasies is slow
and excnlciating and marked by the greatest heroism.
Analytic treaunent is a radically intersubjecti\"e process,
and, in the case of MPD, it is dramatically so. Patient and
therapist arc locked in a system of reciprocal. mutual influ-
ence (Stolorowetal., 1987), in wbich each constantly affccts
and is affccted by the other. Thc paticnt not only fears that
thc tJlcrapist will bccome the perpetrator; the patient will
inedtably evoke controlling or sadistic responses (hopeful-
ly, mostly manageable, uscable ones) from the therapist.
5imilady-and til is is particularly relevan t for the cu rren t arti-
cle-the patient will not on I}' ycarn for soothing or enhanc-
ing responses from the therapist but will inevitably trigger
in the therapist such selfobject responses, or the opposite
responses of feeling deplctcd, cngulfed or wanting to get
away. In shan, in a successful treatment, the therapist will
alternately be experienced both as the ~old~ parnogenicobject,
a source offearand resistance, and the "new, - nceded objcct,
the target of one's most profound relational longings
(Stolorow et aI., 1987).
~loreO\'er, once the needs and lonbrings begin to be felt
in all their rawness, the patient then will ha\"e to deal Witll
the pain and frustration of reconciling tllese new felt parts
of the self WitJl the realities of the shocking depri\<ltions of
the past as well as the ne\'er-eompletel}'-gralif}ing realities
of the present and fmure, The patient must also learn to 101-
erate contradiclo') affects and needs and thus to hold for
the first time the paradoxical tension of opposites in one
consciousness (\\'innicou. 1971; Schwartz. 1994).
The integration of the split~lfragerequires particular
sensiti\;ty and restraint on the part of the therapist. for this
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process can plunge thc patienl into the depths ofsuicidali-
tyand homicidalil)'and the therapist inlo a cyclone ofcoun-
tertransference reacthit\" The patient who has been bnl-
taliLed holds within her the extremes ofaggression created
not only in reaction 10 abuse but also via identificationswith
sadislic aggressors. aggressive stales which ha\"e onl\' been
manageable when relegated to certain -hosrile- alters. But
when these baser, aggre'lsive instincts begin 10 be interpreted
as the patient·sown.the patient can feelsoshameful.so C\i!.
so sick. so despicable that the only solution appears to be to
blot out this illlolerabic new sense of self through suicide.
-'loreO\'er, when lhe lherapistconfronts the patielll'ssadism.
the patiem can experience the therapisl as -disanning" him
or her and lea\ing her defenseless. prompting him or her
10 new levels of sadistic and coerciw aggression in a des-
perate attempt 10 correct whal is experienced as a power
imbalance in tlle relationship. The patient's homicidalil\'
rna} also be transformed into suicidality in an attempt to
prOlect the therapist. The therapist's task often seems to be
an impossible one: to acknowledge the patient's rage, hate,
revenge, etc., \\ithin the therapeutic relationship while not
shaming or -disanning- the patient to such an extent that
he or she falls into suicidaUt\ or homicidalil)".
In summan'. the therapist must be careful to acknowl·
edge......elcome into the treatment and empathize \\;th all
the different need/affect states. so as not to replicate the
patient's intCOlal politics of exclusion and repudiation
(Rivcra, 1989). At the same time. the therapist must recog~
nize and hold the essential wholeness (or potential whole-
ness) of lhe systcm. As the patient experiences the thera-
piSl's empathy for alllhc different parts of the self \\ith their
attendant need states, she or he will experience increased
empathy among the alters, <I sharing of lheir often contra-
dicto')' need and affect states. and a diminishing of tbeir
separateness.
CONCLUSION
Chronic, scverc abuse leads not only to the dissociation
of traumatic memories and the other sequelae of trauma
but to the dissodalion of the child's healthy, de\'elopmen-
tal rclational needs and wishes as well. This expanded \iew
ofdissociation suggests that treatment must include the rema-
bilization of those early needs and longings of the self with-
in the transference relationship and. ultimately, to theirillle-
gration into the patient 'scentral selfexperience. It also helps
elucidate how the dissociativc defense "takes oneself alit of
relationship for the sake of relationship- (Gilligan. 1990).
By sequestering early relational need states, the dissociative
indh~dua1 takes out of thc relationship that which is most
offensive to the pathologicallv-\"ulnerablecaretakersand thus,
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